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FreeBSD + PF + пассивный брандмауэр = разочарование

У меня есть сервер FreeBSD, на котором я пытаюсь настроить FTP. Если отключить pf, все отлично работает.

Если я подключаюсь во время работы pf, я могу успешно войти в систему, но как только я запускаю ls, я получаю следующее:

ftp> ls
229 Entering Extended Passive Mode (|||61162|)

И тогда ничего .. наконец я получаю следующее: 421 Служба недоступна, время ожидания удаленного сервера истекло. Соединение закрыто

Я копирую свой файл pf.conf ниже, если кто-нибудь может мне помочь, я был бы поражен!

### macro name for external interface.
ext_if = "re0"
allowed_icmp_types = "echoreq"

### all incoming traffic on external interface is normalized and fragmented
### packets are reassembled.
scrub in on $ext_if all fragment reassemble

### FTP Proxy stuff
nat-anchor "ftp-proxy/*"
rdr-anchor "ftp-proxy/*"
rdr pass proto tcp from any to any port ftp -> 127.0.0.1 port 8021

### set a default deny everything policy.
block log all

### exercise antispoofing on the external interface, but add the local
### loopback interface as an exception, to prevent services utilizing the
### local loop from being blocked accidentally.
set skip on lo0
antispoof for $ext_if inet

### block anything coming from sources that we have no back routes for.
block in log from no-route to any

### block packets that fail a reverse path check. we look up the routing
### table, check to make sure that the outbound is the same as the source
### it came in on. if not, it is probably source address spoofed.
#block in from urpf-failed to any

### drop broadcast requests quietly.
block in quick on $ext_if from any to 255.255.255.255

### block packets claiming to come from reserved internal address blocks, as
### they are obviously forged and cannot be contacted from the outside world.
block in log quick on $ext_if from { 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16, 255.255.255.255/32 } to any

### block probes that can possibly determine our operating system by disallowing
### certain combinations that are commonly used by nmap, queso and xprobe2, who
### are attempting to fingerprint the server.
### * F : FIN  - Finish; end of session
### * S : SYN  - Synchronize; indicates request to start session
### * R : RST  - Reset; drop a connection
### * P : PUSH - Push; packet is sent immediately
### * A : ACK  - Acknowledgement
### * U : URG  - Urgent
### * E : ECE  - Explicit Congestion Notification Echo
### * W : CWR  - Congestion Window Reduced
block in log quick on $ext_if proto tcp flags FUP/WEUAPRSF
block in log quick on $ext_if proto tcp flags WEUAPRSF/WEUAPRSF
block in log quick on $ext_if proto tcp flags SRAFU/WEUAPRSF
block in log quick on $ext_if proto tcp flags /WEUAPRSF
block in log quick on $ext_if proto tcp flags SR/SR
block in log quick on $ext_if proto tcp flags SF/SF

### keep state on any outbound tcp, udp or icmp traffic. modulate the isn of
### outgoing packets. (initial sequence number) broken operating systems
### sometimes don't randomize this number, making it guessable.
pass out on $ext_if proto { tcp, udp, icmp } from any to any modulate state

### normally, a client connects to the server and we handshake with them, then
### proceed to exchange data. by telling pf to handshake proxy between the client
### and our server, tcp syn flood attacts from ddos become uneffective because
### a spoofed client cannot complete a handshake.

### set a rule that allows inbound ssh traffic with synproxy handshaking.
pass in on $ext_if proto tcp from any to any port ssh flags S/SA synproxy state

### set a rule that allows inbound www traffic with synproxy handshaking.
pass in on $ext_if proto tcp from any to any port www flags S/SA synproxy state

# Allow icmp
pass in log quick inet proto icmp all icmp-type $allowed_icmp_types keep state

### lets try this
#pass in on $ext_if proto tcp from any to any port ftp flags S/SA synproxy state
pass in on $ext_if inet proto tcp from port ftp-data to ($ext_if) user proxy flags S/SA keep state
### NTP allowed
pass in on $ext_if proto tcp from any to any port ntp
pass in on $ext_if proto udp from any to any port ntp
pass out on $ext_if proto tcp to any port ntp
pass out on $ext_if proto udp to any port ntp

### FTP Passive BS
###pass in quick on $ext_if proto tcp from any to any port 30000:60000
pass in on $ext_if proto tcp from any to any port 21 keep state
#pass in on $ext_if proto tcp from any to any port > 49151 keep state

### FTP Outgoing Proxy Stuff
anchor "ftp-proxy/*"

### setup a table and ruleset that prevents excessive abuse by hosts
### that attempt to brute force the ssh daemon with repeated requests.
### any host that hammers more than 3 connections in 5 seconds gets
### all their packet states killed and dropped into a blackhole table.
table <ssh_abuse> persist
block in quick from <ssh_abuse>
pass in on $ext_if proto tcp to any port ssh flags S/SA keep state (max-src-conn 10, max-src-conn-rate 3/5, overload <ssh_abuse> flush)

Проблема связана с тем, что пассивный FTP использует порты, отличные от 21. Читайте об этом здесь: http://slacksite.com/other/ftp.html

Обычно, если я настраиваю FTP-сервер, я либо добавляю хосты в белый список, как сказал voretaq, либо вы обычно можете установить диапазон пассивных портов для использования в конфигурации FTP и просто открыть эти порты.

Чтобы скрыть очевидное - вы используете демон ftp-proxy, и ваш уровень безопасности <= 1, верно? (см. также справочную страницу ftp-proxy (8), которая, вероятно, будет более полезной, чем я буду - FTP, и я не ладим)

По моему опыту, FTP ужасно нарушен за любым приличным межсетевым экраном - обычно я сдаюсь и разрешаю весь исходящий трафик (и обратный трафик с отслеживанием состояния) с ограниченного числа хостов, которые необходимость делать FTP, который обычно красиво обходит проблему ...